US Supreme Court Institutional Integrity in Case Selection
Gordon Ballingrud
Social Science Quarterly, 2025, vol. 106, issue 7
Abstract:
Objectives This study moves cert choices away from models of maximizing preferences over policy and toward securing the Court's institutional integrity, in which other actors of government, like the executive branch, are potential threats. I seek to add to our understanding of docket construction by focusing on preserving the institution through conflict avoidance as opposed to preference maximization. Methods The Songer Shepardized database served as the basis for this model.s analysis. Into it I added variables like the ideological scores of President, and key Supreme Court decision‐makers such as the Court median, and the “cert pivot”, an idea developed for this study. Also included were indices for case type, number of amici, constitutional issues, and more. Logistic regression is the analytical method of choice due to the outcome variable's dichotomous nature. Results The results only matched the theory partly. Ideological distance did reduce the probability of issuing a writ of certiorari, but this was so across vertical and lateral cases both. This result suggests that the Court.s sensitivity to the government's preferences spans across different case types. However, the case outcome—whether the federal government won or lost—proved crucial, providing the best evidence for the theory. Conclusions This work sought to bring together two literatures: one on the influences of the Court.s tendency to grant certiorari, and the Court's tendency to alter its behavior to protect its institutional integrity from untoward external actors. The results, at this point, have proven inconclusive. But further research may illuminate this area of judicial behavior to a greater extent.
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.70090
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:socsci:v:106:y:2025:i:7:n:e70090
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0038-4941
Access Statistics for this article
Social Science Quarterly is currently edited by Robert L. Lineberry
More articles in Social Science Quarterly from Southwestern Social Science Association
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().