EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Worker Representativeses

Julian Budde, Thomas Dohmen, Simon Jäger and Simon Trenkle

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We study the descriptive and substantive representation of workers through worker representatives, focusing on the selection of German works council representatives and their impact on worker outcomes. Becoming a professional representative leads to substantial wage gains for the elected, concentrated among blue-collar workers. Representatives are positively selected in terms of pre-election earnings and person fixed effects. They are more likely to have undergone vocational training, show greater interest in politics, and lean left politically compared to the employees they represent; blue-collar workers are close to proportionally represented among works councilors. Drawing on a retirement-IV strategy and event-study designs around council elections, we find that blue-collar representatives reduce involuntary separations, consistent with blue-collar workers placing stronger emphasis on job security.

Keywords: worker representatives; works councils; linked administrative and survey data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 J53 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp581 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_581

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany Kaiserstr. 1, 53113 Bonn , Germany.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CRC Office ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_581