Second-Hand Markets and Collusion by Manufacturers of Semidurable Goods

Schiraldi, Pasquale

Second-Hand Markets and Collusion by Manufacturers of Semidurable Goods

No WP2006-028, Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from Boston University - Department of Economics

Abstract: I show that when oligopolistic firms manufacture semidurable goods, second-hand\par markets can play a key role in supporting collusive behavior. This in spite of the fact\par that a monopolist manufacturer has an incentive to eliminate second-hand markets \endash\par a point made by a number of authors. The idea that second-hand markets facilitate\par collusion is supported by the many examples in which manufacturers strengthen secondhands\par markets, e.g. by providing warranty coverage across owners, or by encouraging\par dealers to accept trade-ins. The intuition is that the prospect of obtaining a high\par price in a second-hand market increases the demand for new goods. This means that\par the expectation of a price war unleashed by the violation of a collusive agreement will\par decrease not only the future prices of the new and used goods but also the current price\par of the new good, thus making the defection itself less profitable. In this framework,\par I analyze the role of leasing policies, buyback policies and warranty coverage for used\par units.

Keywords: Bertrand competition; buy-back policies; collusion; leasing; semi-durability; \par second-hand market; warranty. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 L11 L13 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2006-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Second-Hand Markets and Collusion byManufacturers of Semidurable Goods (2009)
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