Concessions and Repression in Conflict

Akifumi Ishihara and Prakarsh Singh

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016, vol. 16, issue 2, 865-899

Abstract: We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with a rebel group using concessions and repression. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are concessions but no repression or a state of repressive equilibrium that can lead to civil wars. At the lowest levels of political competition, a move towards open electoral participation decreases the ability of the state to use repression to limit challengers, increasing the likelihood of war. At higher levels, an increase in competition decreases the probability of war by increasing concessions to the rebel group. Increasing concessions makes war less likely because it decreases the spoils of war and provides one explanation for the non-monotonicity found between probability of civil war and democracy. We test the prediction of this non-linearity using the technique in [Hansen (2000). “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica 68:575–603] and find evidence consistent with the model.

Keywords: conflict; repression; political competition; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D74 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0017

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