A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions

Tim Friehe and Mungan Murat C. ()
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Mungan Murat C.: George Mason University, 3301 Fairfax Dr., Arlington, VA 22201, USA

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2020, vol. 20, issue 1, 8

Abstract: This article shows that regulatory sanctions that fall into an intermediate range can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that intermediate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and dynamic efficiency.

Keywords: regulation; sanctions; compliance; technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2019-0122

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