Optimal Contracts for Health Services in the Presence of Waiting Times and Asymmetric Information

Luigi Siciliani

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 27

Abstract: This study presents a model of optimal contracting for health services in the presence of excess demand and waiting times. We assume that: i) hospitals differ in their demand for treatment; ii) potential demand is private information of the provider; iii) specialists can dump patients; iv) activity and waiting times are contractible. A separating equilibrium exists when it is optimal for the purchaser to contract more activity and longer waiting times to those hospitals with higher demand. Hospitals with low demand gain informational rents. A pooling equilibrium may also occur.

Keywords: contracts; health care; waiting times; rationing; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1661 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:40

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejeap/html

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1661

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().