A New Type of Evolutionary Strategy Based on a Multi-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Xie Nenggang (), Ye Ye, Bao Wei and Wang Meng
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Xie Nenggang: School of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China
Ye Ye: School of Mechanical Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China
Bao Wei: School of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China
Wang Meng: School of Business, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China

Journal of Systems Science and Information, 2020, vol. 8, issue 1, 67-81

Abstract: According to the philosophy of self-cultivation that “one should refine his personal virtue when in poverty, and help save the world when in success”, a new type of evolutionary strategy, Poor-Competition-Rich-Cooperation (PCRC), is proposed. To discuss its superiority and inferiority, based on a multi-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, PCRC and other six kinds of strategies are played by using the roulette method in three different populations (a uniformly distributed population, a cooperation-preference population, a defection-preference population). The payoff characteristics for each strategy under different temptation coefficients and noise values are also analyzed. Simulation results indicate that PCRC has a sufficient robustness and its payoff presents a basically monotonic increasing tendency with the increment of noise. The superiority of PCRC becomes more obvious when the temptation coefficient becomes larger. Furthermore, a higher population preference for defection yields a more obvious advantage for PCRC.

Keywords: game; Prisoner’s Dilemma; PCRC; robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:jossai:v:8:y:2020:i:1:p:67-81:n:5

DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2020-067-15

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