The Political Economy of Veto Overrides. Evidence from Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)

Teye Joshua () and Kemboi Dorothy ()
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Teye Joshua: 5631 West Virginia University , Morgantown, USA
Kemboi Dorothy: 5631 West Virginia University , Morgantown, USA

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2025, vol. 31, issue 3, 305-321

Abstract: This paper investigates the political economy of veto overrides, with a focus on the 2016 override of President Obama’s veto of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). The Act, which allows victims of the 9/11 attacks to pursue legal action against foreign governments involved in terrorism, provides a unique case to analyze the factors influencing legislative behavior on high-stakes national security issues. Utilizing a probit regression model, we assess how various legislator characteristics including party affiliation, regional impact, occupation, race, and education influenced the voting decision on the veto override. Our findings indicate that legislator characteristics such as a house representative’s party affiliation, age, whether or not the legislator was up for re-election and representation of districts in states directly affected by the 9/11 attacks for instance, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, were significant predictors of the house representative’s voting decision on the veto override. Similarly, we find that median voter characteristics generally do not affect the legislator’s decision apart from the percentage of constituents with bachelor degrees which lowered the probability of a legislator voting in support of the veto override. This study contributes to a broader understanding of how political and regional considerations intersect in shaping legislative outcomes on national security.

Keywords: veto override; national security; terrorism; median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H11 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2024-0058

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