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Turkeys Do Not Vote for Christmas. The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law

Carmo Andreia reis Do ()
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Carmo Andreia reis Do: King’s College London, King’s Brazil Institute, Chesham Building, Strand, LondonWC2R 2LS, UK

Comparative Southeast European Studies, 2018, vol. 66, issue 3, 325-348

Abstract: The research to date shows conflicting results about the effect of perceived corruption on political participation by the public. Corruption perception can mobilize, demobilize, or show no impact on political participation. The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law of 1999, one of the fastest laws ever to be approved in the country, is an example of how perceived corruption can increase public engagement. Using process tracing, the author tells this story identifying two sets of factors ranked according to their causal power (distal and proximal conditions) and further test the theory. The Brazilian population, who perceived corruption as high, learned about the antidemocratic aspects of vote buying and how to curb it. This ‘informed’ perception of corruption led people to politically participate by signing the popular initiative.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:soeuro:v:66:y:2018:i:3:p:325-348:n:3

DOI: 10.1515/soeu-2018-0027

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