Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in Ultimatum Games

Pamela Schmitt (), Robert Shupp, Kurtis Swope () and Justin Mayer
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Justin Mayer: U. S. Naval Academy

No 200503, Working Papers from Ball State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper uses responder pre-commitment and psychological type, as measured by the Myers- Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being accepted. Offers are higher when proposers know that responders make a binding pre-commitment to reject but are not different when a hostage is present. Responders make lower pre-commitments when they are binding and when a hostage is present. Behavior in our experiment is generally consistent with hypotheses based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological type.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; preferences; personality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2005-05, Revised 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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http://econfac.bsu.edu/research/workingpapers/bsuecwp200503schmitt.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in Ultimatum Games (2004)
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