the Role of Outside Considerations in the Design of Compensation Schemes

Bernard Caillaud () and Benjamin Hermalin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: principle-agent models; outside considerations; contracting game observability; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Role of outside considerations in the design of compensation schemes (the) (1989)
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