Fairness Under Risk: Insights from Dictator Games

Vitezslav Babicky

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: Recent theories of fairness (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) have typically used the assumption of ex ante known pie size. Here I explore theoretically the ramifications of pie size being unknown ex ante. Using a simple allocation problem known as dictator game, I find that attitude to fairness is systematically and intuitively related to risk and risk attitude. Results from informal experiments support the model proposed here.

Keywords: inequity aversion; dictator game; risk; expected utility; constant relative risk-aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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