Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of Change in Parameterization

Jana Krajcova

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: I analyze subjects’ sensitivity to parametric change that does not affect the theoretical prediction. I find that increasing the value of an illegal transaction to a briber and reducing the penalties to both culprits leads to more bribes being paid but does not affect the cooperation of the bribee. My data also suggest that trust and preferences towards others might play a role. My paper provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption measures and adds evidence to the on-going discussion on the need for sociodemographic controls.

Keywords: Corruption; anti-corruption mechanisms; optimal contract; monitoring. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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