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The Political Economy of Industrialization

Vladimir Shchukin

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: In this paper, I propose a theory that explains why the landowning elite promoted industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. I argue that this elite used public investment (e.g. railroad construction) strategically to undermine capitalists’ support for revolution and thereby stabilize the existing political regime. Specifically, increased public investment enhanced the productivity of the industrial sector, thereby increasing capital income and augmenting capitalists’ wealth. Greater wealth among capitalists translated into heightened potential losses from redistributive policies if political power shifted to the working class, which imposes higher taxes. If there is a positive probability that the working class will take power, the potential higher degree of public investment they will impose will always mean that capitalists will prefer to maintain the political regime of landowners.

Keywords: industrialization; political commitment; democratization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
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