Wealth Tax Mobility and Tax Coordination

David Agrawal, Dirk Foremny and Clara Martínez-Toledano

No 11048, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study the effects of decentralized wealth taxation on mobility and the effectiveness of tax coordination at mitigating tax competition. We exploit the reintroduction of the Spanish wealth tax, after which all regions except Madrid levied positive tax rates. We find the mobility responses to wealth taxes are within the range of prior estimates with respect to income taxes. However, wealth tax mobility responses generate losses to personal income tax revenues that are six times larger than the direct losses to wealth taxes. Madrid could achieve higher total regional revenues by agreeing to a harmonized positive tax rate.

Keywords: wealth taxes; mobility; fiscal decentralization; fiscal federalism; tax coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E21 H24 H31 H73 J61 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Wealth Tax Mobility and Tax Coordination (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11048

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