Brokering Votes with Information Spread Via Social Networks

Raúl Duarte, Frederico Finan, Horacio Larreguy and Laura Schechter

No 11349, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes throughout much of the developing world. We investigate how social networks facilitate these vote-buying exchanges. Our conceptual framework suggests brokers should be particularly well-placed within the network to learn about non-copartisans’ reciprocity in order to target transfers effectively. As a result, parties should recruit brokers who are central among non-copartisans. We combine village network data from brokers and citizens with broker reports of vote buying, allowing us to use broker and citizen fixed effects. We show that networks diffuse information about citizens to brokers who leverage it to target transfers. In particular, among those citizens who are not registered to their party, brokers target reciprocal citizens about whom they can learn more through their network, and these citizens are more likely to support the brokers’ party. Moreover, recruited brokers are significantly more central than other citizens among non-copartisans, but not among copartisans. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying, broker recruitment, and ultimately for political outcomes.

Keywords: vote buying; brokers; social networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-net, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Brokering Votes With Information Spread Via Social Networks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11349

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