The Compliance Effects of the Automatic Exchange of Information: Evidence from the Swiss Tax Amnesty

Enea Baselgia

No 11615, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of the 2017 multilateral automatic exchange of information (AEoI) on tax compliance in Switzerland. Using detailed administrative tax data and difference-in-differences designs, I find significant positive compliance effects. The AEoI prompted 107k taxpayers (2% of all) to participate in the amnesty, disclosing CHF 42.3 billion—over 6% of GDP. At the micro level, once evaders participate in the amnesty, their reported wealth increases by approximately 50% on average, with compliance effects persisting in the medium run. Furthermore, I document that tax evasion in Switzerland is widespread and significantly more evenly distributed than in other countries.

Keywords: tax evasion; AEoI; compliance; enforcement; CRS; tax amnesty; inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 F38 F42 H24 H26 K34 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-law and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11615

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