On Pendular Voting

Hans Gersbach

No 11783, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: “Pendular Voting” presents a novel two-stage voting procedure: A randomly chosen citizen group votes on a proposal replacing the status quo. Depending on the outcome, a “counterproposal” ensues, that is closer to/further away from the status quo than the original proposal. All citizens vote pairwise on the status quo, initial proposal, and counterproposal (majority voting), the counterproposal being the default outcome in case of cyclical collective preferences. We analyze the process on a one-dimensional policy space, allowing for uncertainty about preference distribution. Manipulation may only occur in the first stage, without impacting the final outcome. Pendular Voting can engineer outcomes closer to the median voter’s preferences than standard procedures, even with selfish agenda setters.

Keywords: democracy; manipulation; information sharing; referendum. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11783

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