Economic Shocks and the Electoral Fortunes of Effective Legislators

Davide Cipullo and Barton E. Lee

No 11791, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Analyzing U.S. House elections (2002-2010), measures of legislators’ effectiveness, and exogenous increases in Chinese import competition, we document a conditional relationship between legislative effectiveness and electoral success. In districts ex-posed to large trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were more likely to be reelected compared to less effective incumbents. Instead, in districts exposed to small trade shocks, more effective incumbents were less likely to be reelected. Our results are driven by trade shocks affecting voters’ preferences for policy change and, in turn, their support for effective legislators. Our results have consequences for the effectiveness of future legislators.

Keywords: legislative effectiveness; China shock; elections; trade shock (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F14 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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