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Psychological Mechanisms for Eliciting Preferences and Beliefs

Evan Friedman, Suanna Oh and Duncan Webb

No 11859, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Accurately measuring preferences and beliefs in surveys is crucial for social science research, but standard monetary incentives cannot be used when responses cannot be verified. We study two psychological mechanisms for improving answer quality that can be applied to unverifiable questions: (i) an unexpected bonus payment designed to trigger reciprocity towards the researcher, and (ii) telling respondents that they will later be paid to accurately restate their previously-given answers, which could motivate careful initial answers that are naturally easier to reconstruct. In a large online experiment (N=2,428), the bonus method modestly improves both answer correctness and consistency, driven by increased effort and reciprocity. The restatement method, however, does not consistently improve answer quality, primarily because participants exert effort trying to memorize their answers instead of answering carefully. These results demonstrate the potential and limitations of using psychological mechanisms to improve the quality of survey responses.

Keywords: restatement method; bonus method; incentives; survey. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C83 C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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