For (Un)Love or (of) Taxes? How Taxing Bachelors Empowered Italian Women

Enrico Rubolino and Enrico Rubolino

No 11998, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Unpaid domestic work continues to fall largely on women, despite their growing presence in the workforce. This paper asks whether policies changing the relative bargaining position of spouses can disrupt this pattern. I use the introduction of a bachelor tax in fascist Italy to show that altering men’s incentives to marry shaped the allocation of domestic work. Men in tax-induced marriages took on more domestic work, while their wives gained time, agency, and better economic outcomes. Effects are long-lasting and transmitted across generations: women raised in households with more equitable labor divisions also perform less housework. The findings suggest shocks in bargaining power can loosen the hold of social norms and reconfigure domestic life.

Keywords: domestic work; female labor force participation; intra-household bargaining; bachelor tax; marriage market; gender-based taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H31 J12 J16 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11998

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