The Effects of Tenure-Track Systems on Selection and Productivity in Economics

Marco Nieddu, Roberto Nisticò and Lorenzo Pandolfi

No 12090, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper examines how publication-based tenure-track systems affect the careers of Ph.D. graduates in Economics. We leverage a 2010 reform in Italy that replaced open-ended assistant professor (AP) positions with fixed-term contracts and introduced publication minimum requirements for career advancement. Using survey and administrative data, along with a Difference-in-Differences Event-Study approach comparing Economics to less academicallyoriented fields, we find that the reform significantly reduced the likelihood of Economics Ph.D. graduates entering academia in Italy, while increasing transitions to academic careers abroad or to public and private sector jobs. Talented graduates were disproportionately affected, revealing negative selection into Italian academia following the removal of permanent AP positions. Despite these trends, tenure-track hires tend to publish more in high-ranking journals, suggesting that the reform’s incentive effects may partly mitigate its negative selection effects.

Keywords: academic careers; fertility; publications; tenure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 J13 J24 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-sog
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12090

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