The National Carbon Price and Welfare on Alternative Paths Towards Net Zero Emissions: Simple Versus Optimal Policy Rules

Rasmus Kehlet Skjødt Berg and Peter Birch Sørensen

No 12101, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: To study the economic and welfare consequences of alternative time paths towards net zero CO2e emissions, we develop a multi-sector dynamic computable general equilibrium model of an open economy with heterogeneity in abatement costs across sectors and firms and with adjustment costs in the adoption of abatement technologies and other types of investment. We measure the welfare costs of following the simple rules for emissions reduction observed in practice rather than the optimal national policy rule prescribed by economic theory. In an undistorted economy subject to a carbon budget, the theoretically optimal climate policy is a "Hotelling rule" where the carbon tax rate increases year by year at the real rate of interest. However, when some consumers are credit-constrained, it is optimal to deviate from the Hotelling rule and use carbon taxation to redistribute income towards poor hand-to-mouth consumers. Nevertheless, in aggregate terms very little welfare is lost by following a Hotelling rule or a linear emissions reduction path rather than the optimal time path for carbon taxes when climate policy is subject to a carbon budget. The optimal carbon tax path towards a simple end-point target for net zero emissions implies a much higher welfare cost per ton of accumulated GHG emissions than a policy constrained by a carbon budget.

Keywords: alternative climate policy rules; hotelling rule for optimal climate policy; computable general equilibrium; abatement costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C67 C68 H21 H23 Q01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp12101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12101

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().