Research Waves

Mariagiovanna Baccara, Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

No 12248, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Competing research waves start and grow as scientists choose their specialization driven by career incentives. We build a strategic experimentation framework where agents irreversibly choose between two risky fields, and information arrives faster as more agents specialize in a field. In the "bad news" case, if no news arrives, all agents join a bandwagon wave into one field. In the "good news"' case, both fields are explored in two sequential surges, followed by slow entry into the initially inferior field. We describe how the equilibrium depends on the information-production technology, and assess the impact of first-mover advantages, congestion, and deadlines.

Keywords: strategic experimentation; research specialisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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