Making the Cut: Close Elections and Local Welfare Policy

Nikolaj Broberg, Tuuli Tähtinen () and Thomas Walsh

No 12358, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Welfare benefit sanctions are a common tool in many social insurance systems. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, we investigate how representatives’ political alignment influences the implementation of a new sanction regime in the UK. Our results show that constituencies aligned with the Conservative-led central government experience significantly fewer sanctions. The RD estimate indicates a drop of 0.8 percentage points, implying 18 % lower sanction rates in central government controlled constituencies. These findings demonstrate that partisan alignment can systematically shape the local implementation of a national, rule-based policies.

Keywords: political alignment; close elections; policy implementation; fiscal consolidation; unemployment benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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