Dishonesty in Complex Environments: Deliberate Lies, Shortcuts, or Accidental Mistakes?

Pascal Nieder and Sven Arne Simon

No 12692, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Compliance with complex regulatory requirements can be challenging. We study why and how complexity affects non-compliance in terms of incorrect reporting. Our novel experimental design isolates two distinct complexity effects: an increase in honest mistakes and a substantial shift toward self-serving dishonesty. We identify two mechanisms for this dishonesty shift. First, individuals with social image concerns systematically take advantage of plausible deniability. Second, we document an unexplored form of dishonesty: besides conscious lies, individuals use fraudulent shortcuts in response to complex cheating opportunities.

Keywords: dishonest behavior; complexity; lying; non-compliance; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 H26 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12692

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