Identity Uncertainty

Anujit Chakraborty, Arkadev Ghosh, Matt Lowe, Gareth Nellis and Tanika Chakraborty

No 12792, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Many group identities that influence economic behavior are imperfectly observed. Individuals and institutions often conceal identity markers to limit discrimination. Yet concealment also creates uncertainty about group membership, hampering coordination in social interaction. To study this tradeoff, we paired high- and low-caste men for collaborative data entry work in North India. We randomly assigned each mixed-caste pair to either be: (i) introduced by full names, making caste common knowledge; (ii) introduced by first names only, making caste disclosure a choice; or (iii) instructed not to disclose caste. The two concealment conditions substantially reduce the accuracy of beliefs about a partner’s caste and confidence in those beliefs. They also weaken workplace relations, lowering trust, willingness to interact, and perceived productivity—consistent with identity helping structure social coordination. Evidence on mechanisms shows that identity concealment inhibits authentic interaction, making workers less able to express their “true selves,” while certainty about a partner’s identity is associated with stronger workplace ties. Concealment leaves a sizable caste disparity in higher-status role assignment intact, suggesting minimal impacts on discrimination. We conclude that where group identities are socially entrenched, reducing their legibility may undermine intergroup relations.

Keywords: social identity; caste; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D83 J71 O12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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