Comparative Statics of Information Acquisition and Risk Aversion

Antonio Cabrales, Gregorio Curello, Olivier Gossner and Roberto Serrano

No 12982, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study how willingness to pay for information depends on risk aversion when a decision maker faces background risk and can acquire information before choosing from a menu of assets. We distinguish investment menus, whose payoffs are procyclical with background wealth, from insurance menus, whose payoffs are countercyclical. Our main results show that the interaction between asset cyclicality and the tail geometry of background risk determines the direction of the comparative statics. When the density of background risk is log-concave, willingness to pay for information decreases with risk aversion for investment menus, whereas with downward-log-convex background risk it increases with risk aversion for insurance menus. The proofs compare the distributions of terminal wealth with and without information and develop new aggregation arguments for state-dependent single-crossing comparisons. We also construct reversals under strictly log-convex tails for investment menus and super-exponential left tails for insurance menus.

Keywords: investment; insurance; background risk tails; risk aversion; value of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 C43 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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