Common Ownership and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Patrick Arnold, Marc Moller and Makoto Watanabe

No 13095, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper considers the effects of common ownership on advance purchase markets featuring intertemporal price discrimination (e.g. airline tickets). Common ownership increases advance prices, while spot prices can decrease. We show that common ownership is anticompetitive but the increase in average transacted prices is smaller than under uniform pricing, although consumers shift towards more informed, more expensive purchases. Common ownership is less detrimental for consumers than under uniform pricing and can even benefit consumers when consumers are sufficiently uninformed about their preferences in advance.

Keywords: common ownership; intertemporal price discrimination; advance selling; consumer learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13095

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