Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?

Helge Berger (), Volker Nitsch and Tonny Lybek

No 1897, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Keywords: committee; council; governance; decision making; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ? (2008)
Working Paper: Central Bank Boards around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2008)
Working Paper: Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ? (2008)
Working Paper: Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1897

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