Regulation and Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Reference Pricing or Price Cap Regulation?
Kurt Brekke (),
Astrid Grasdal and
Tor Helge Holmås
No 2059, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We study the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing strategies using a unique policy experiment from Norway, which in 2003 introduced a reference price (RP) system called “index pricing” for a sub-sample of off-patent pharmaceuticals, replacing the existing price cap (PC) regulation. We estimate the effect of the reform using a product level panel dataset, covering the drugs exposed to RP and a large number of drugs still under PC regulation in the time before and after the policy change. Our results show that RP significantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices within the reference group, with the effect being stronger for brand-names. We also identify a negative cross-price effect on therapeutic substitutes not included in the RP-system. In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that RP is more effective than PC regulation in lowering drug prices, while the cross-price effect raises a concern about patent protection.
Keywords: pharmaceuticals; price regulation; branded-generic competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 L13 L51 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Regulation and pricing of pharmaceuticals: Reference pricing or price cap regulation? (2009) 
Working Paper: Regulation and Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Reference Pricing or Price Cap Regulation? (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2059
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