Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices

Kurt Brekke (), Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume

No 2635, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering both the effect of (i) introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and (ii) increasing competition through lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.

Keywords: hospitals; competition; quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices (2011)
Working Paper: Hospital competition and quality with regulated prices (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2635

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