Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries

Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler

No 2737, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for two-sided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares. We show that advertisement levels depend neither on the media price nor on the location of the media firm. An increase in advertising revenues does not change location but only the media price. If the distribution of consumers is asymmetric, market shares will be asymmetric as well, and the media firm with the larger market share charges the higher media price. The larger firm makes a higher profit per reader and in aggregate compared to its smaller rival.

Keywords: Hotelling; general density function; media; location (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2737.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2737

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().