Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings?

Margit Osterloh and Bruno Frey

No 2797, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Peer reviews and rankings today are the backbone of research governance, but recently came under scrutiny. They take explicitly or implicitly agency theory as a theoretical basis. The emerging psychological economics opens a new perspective. As scholarly research is a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, we include intrinsic motivation and supportive feedback by the peers as important determinants of scholarly behavior. We discuss whether a stronger emphasis on selection and socialization offers an alternative to the present regime of academic rankings.

Keywords: peer reviews; rankings; research governance; agency theory; psychological economics; new public management; economics of science; control theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings? (2009)
Working Paper: Research governance in academia: are there alternatives to academic rankings? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2797

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