What is the Best Environmental Policy? Taxes, Permits and Rules under Economic and Environmental Uncertainty
Konstantinos Angelopoulos (),
George Economides and
Apostolis Philippopoulos
No 2980, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We study the importance of uncertainty and public finance to the welfare ranking of three environmental policy instruments: pollution taxes, pollution permits and Kyoto-like numerical rules for emissions. The setup is the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented with the assumptions that pollution occurs as a by-product of output produced and environmental quality is treated as a public good. To compare alternative policies, we compute welfare-maximizing values for the second-best policy instruments. We find that, in all cases studied, pollution permits are the worst policy choice, even when their revenues finance public abatement. When the main source of uncertainty is economic, the most efficient recipe is to levy pollution taxes and use the collected tax revenues to finance public abatement. However, when environmental uncertainty is the dominant source of extrinsic uncertainty, numerical rules, being combined with tax-financed public abatement, are better than pollution taxes.
Keywords: general equilibrium; uncertainty; environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 D81 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2980.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: What is the best environmental policy? Taxes, permits and rules under economic and environmental uncertainty (2010) 
Working Paper: What is the best environmental policy?Taxes, permits and rules under economic and environmental uncertainty (2010) 
Working Paper: What is the best environmental policy? Taxes, permits and rules under economic and environmental uncertainty (2010) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2980
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().