Media Market Concentration, Advertising Levels, and Ad Prices

Simon Anderson, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind and Martin Peitz

No 3677, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.

Keywords: media economics; pricing ads; advertising clutter; information congestion; mergers; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3677.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices (2012)
Working Paper: Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3677

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().