Fiscal Competition in Space and Time

David Wildasin

No 370, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper analyzes fiscal competition among numerous spatially- separated jurisdictions in an explicitly dynamic framework. The degree of factor mobility between jurisdictions is imperfect because it is costly and time-consuming to adjust factor stocks. Even if it is harmful in the long run, a jurisdiction's residents can benefit in the short run from taxing mobile factors owned by non-residents. The optimal tax on mobile factors is lower, the faster the speed with which factors adjust to fiscal policy. Anticipated taxes are less beneficial than those that can be imposed unexpectedly.

JEL-codes: H00 R00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal competition in space and time (2003)
Working Paper: Fiscal Competition in Space and Time (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_370

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