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Corruption and Political Stability: Does the Youth Bulge Matter?

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan (farzanegan@uni-marburg.de) and Stefan Witthuhn

No 5890, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This study shows that the relative size of the youth bulge matters for how corruption affects the internal stability of a political system. We argue that corruption cannot buy political stability (e.g., the greasing hypothesis) in countries with a relatively large youth population. Using panel data covering the 2002-2012 period for more than 100 countries, we find a negative interaction effect between the relative size of the youth population and corruption on internal political stability. Corruption is a destabilizing factor for political systems when the share of the youth population in the adult population exceeds a threshold level of approximately 19%. The negative interaction term is robust, controlling for country and year fixed effects, a set of control variables that may affect internal political stability, an alternative operationalization of youth bulge, and a dynamic panel estimation method.

Keywords: demographic transition; youth bulge; political stability; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D74 E02 H56 J11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter? (2017) Downloads
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