Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment

Suehyun Kwon

No 7513, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have correlated persistent types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. The paper first shows revelation principle in this context then shows sufficient conditions for obtaining full-commitment solutions with limited commitment.

Keywords: mechanism design; limited commitment; revelation principle; informed-principal problem; persistence; correlated types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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