The Global Minimum Tax

Niels Johannesen

No 9527, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers real resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.

Keywords: profit shifting; international taxation; global minimum tax; tax avoidance multinational firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-gth, nep-int and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Journal Article: The global minimum tax (2022)
Working Paper: The Global Minimum Tax (2022)
Working Paper: The Global Minimum Tax (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9527

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