What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751

Philip Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
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Jean-Laurent Rosenthal: and UCLA

No 719, UCLA Economics Working Papers from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 1994-10-01
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Journal Article: What do Notaries do?. Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751 (1998)
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