Stakeholders, Transparency and Capital Structure

Andrés Almazán, Javier Suarez and Sheridan Titman

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that leads to the generation of information. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying than increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments, can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding, and can lead firms to choose more conservative capital structures than they would otherwise choose. These effects are likely to be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation for being on the “leading edge”.

Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Stakeholders, Transparency and Capital Structure (2004)
Working Paper: Stakeholder, Transparency and Capital Structure (2003)
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