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Are There Glass Ceilings for Female Executives?

George-Levi Gayle (), Limor Golan () and Robert Miller

GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less, hold more junior positions, and attrit faster. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze promotion and compensation rates. Given executive rank and background, women are paid more than men, experience less income uncertainty, and are promoted as quickly. Amongst survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming CEO. Hence the gender pay gap and job rank differences are primarily attributable to female executives attriting at higher rates than males in an occupation where survival is rewarded with promotion and higher compensation.

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