Are There Glass Ceilings for Female Executives?

George-Levi Gayle (), Limor Golan () and Robert Miller

No 2009-E8, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: Less than 10 percent of executives in large publicly traded firms are women. On average female executives earn less than male executives, and hold less senior positions. They retire earlier. This paper is an empirical study of these differences based on panel of about 2,500 firms and 16,000 executives tracked through 60 job titles over a 14 year period. We construct a simple career hierarchy to analyze promotion rates and compensation for males and females, controlling for firm and industry characteristics, as well as the executive's socioeconomic, demographic and background experience. At any given level in the career hierarchy, women are paid slightly more than men with the same background, have slightly less income uncertainty and are promoted as quickly. We conclude that the gender pay gap and differences in job rank in this most lucrative occupation is explained by females leaving the market at higher rates than males.

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