Preferences and Institutions in European (Dis)Integration

Christophe Crombez, Pieterjan Vangerven and Philippe van Gruisen
Additional contact information
Christophe Crombez: Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, USA / Faculty of Economics and Business, KU Leuven, Belgium
Pieterjan Vangerven: Faculty of Economics and Business, KU Leuven, Belgium
Philippe van Gruisen: Faculty of Economics and Business, KU Leuven, Belgium / Department of Economics, Leiden University, The Netherlands

Politics and Governance, 2023, vol. 11, issue 3, 5-15

Abstract: In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voters they represent. Such politicians may take integration decisions that are not in line with their voters’ interests as a result. We show that voters can in some circumstances prevent integration by strategically electing representatives who are farther away from them. The model provides novel insights into the process of European (dis)integration and the voter–politician dynamics that determine it. In addition, our model offers an alternative explanation for the relative success of extremist parties in the European Union.

Keywords: European integration; European representatives; political institutions; spatial models; voters’ interests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/6781 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cog:poango:v11:y:2023:i:3:p:5-15

DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i3.6781

Access Statistics for this article

Politics and Governance is currently edited by Carolina Correia

More articles in Politics and Governance from Cogitatio Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by António Vieira () and IT Department ().