Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism

Amrita Dhillon ()

No 1995052, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: "Anonymity" and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: "Weak IIA" it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called "Relative Utilitarianism" that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-09-01
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Working Paper: Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1995052

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