Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems

d’ASPREMONT, Claude (), Jacques Crémer () and Louis-André Gérard-Varet
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d’ASPREMONT, Claude: Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Claude d'Aspremont

No 1998010, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auctions and public goods problems with semi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents

Date: 1998-01-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems (2005)
Working Paper: Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1998010

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