A note on the relation between the Shapley value and the core of 3-player transferable utility games

Pierre Dehez () and Pier Mario Pacini ()
Additional contact information
Pier Mario Pacini: University of Pisa

No 3295, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We reconsider the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value of a 3-player superadditive game belongs to the core. We then compute the proportion of games whose Shapley value belongs to the core within the set of balanced superadditive games.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 2024-07-04
Note: In: Economics Bulletin, 2024, 44 (2), p. 611-619
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: A note on the relation between the Shapley value and the core of 3-player transferable utility games (2024)
Working Paper: A note on the relation between the Shapley value and the core of 3-player transferable utility games (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3295

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