Locational Competition versus Cooperation in Labour Markets: An Implicit Contract Reinterpretation

Michael Burda and Antje Mertens

No 1020, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The need for locational competition among labour markets arises when labour is immobile. At the same time market clearing under such conditions can lead to wage and income variability. In such cases demand for insurance against regional shocks arises, which can be provided by nationwide collective bargaining and other national institutions in the spirit of the implicit contract literature. In this interpretation, the desirability of locational competition depends on the nature of shocks which affect the regions. Real wage and other types of flexibility will be invoked by localities only in response to systematic shocks. We present evidence that West German and other European experiences are more consistent with an insurance contract interpretation, while US regional labour markets are characterized by high regional mobility, rendering insurance less relevant.

Keywords: Implicit Contracts; Mobility; Trade Unions; Wage Differentials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 J50 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Locational Competition versus Cooperation in Labor Markets: An Implicit Contract Reinterpretation (1994)
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