The Relation Between Voting Power and Policy Impact in the European Union

Mika Widgrén

No 1033, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine national effects on the common policies of the European Union (EU). The paper establishes a difference between national influence on voting outcomes and policies. It is assumed that policies of the EU are public goods and Holler's public good power index is applied. The method is extended to cover voting games with coalitions to reveal also the effects of cooperation on policies. We show that small countries have more influence on common policies of the EU than on voting outcomes. Coalition formation can, however, ruin this since even coalitions smaller than the blocking minority can control policy.

Keywords: Cooperative Game Theory; European Union; Voting Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 F02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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